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Shipping companies have traditionally been reluctant to
give details of near-miss shipping incidents. A Norwegian
survey provides some pointers.
Safety management
systems in Norway 
A survey from the tanker industry
feedback given to crew on reported events
appeared to be inadequate with 48.1per
cent stating that they never, or only
sometimes, received constructive feedback.
The qualitative data confirmed that
feedback is perceived to be inadequate, too
general and delayed. However, the
implication that the lack of feedback is
contributing to under-reporting may be
good news if the converse is true, and an
improvement in feedback might lead to
better reporting.
Data reliability
One critical SMS system requirement is
the reliability and accuracy of input data:
near miss and incident reports. Indeed, the
ability of the overall system to develop
efficient safety measures depends on this
requirement being met. The shortage of
data that under-reporting causes makes it
hard to analyse trends, root causes and
the like.
Most will agree that under-reporting is
a bad thing. The situation is made worse,
however, when one considers that 36.5 per
cent of respondents admitted to massaging
reports to cover mistakes.
Many incoming reports are less than
accurate, sometimes often or most of the
time. Statistical analysis also indicates
that there is a relationship between the
tendency to massage reports in this way
and the perception of a blame-culture
among those doing so.
A
ll Norwegian shipping
companies have been required
to have a safety management
system (SMS) since the
implementation of the International Safety
Management (ISM) Code.
Recent research has been conducted
into the Norwegian controlled tanker
industry’s safety management record of
incident and near-miss reporting practices,
data analysis, procedures and checklists.
The balance between commercial
pressures and safety concerns were
included a major survey.
This included feedback from 768
respondents and 41 vessels, supported by
two case studies. The results indicate
several SMS related deficiencies.
First, data from the vessels (near
misses and incidents) were substantially
under-reported, and reports that were
received appeared to have been massaged,
to present a better state of affairs than
was in fact the case. 
The data indicates that a complicated
reporting system and a lack of under-
standing of the overall safety management
system may have been responsible for the
under-reporting, and crew fears of negative
consequences may have influenced the
content of ‘massaged’ reports.
Some 36.3 per cent of the respondents
admitted that they never, or only
sometimes, reported close calls, and 35.4
per cent that they never or only sometimes
reported minor incidents. In addition,
That as many as 25.7 per cent of
respondents believe that such a culture
exists within their organisation suggests
that discouraging that perception could
similarly improve the effectiveness of the
SMS.
The fact that the second and third most
frequent reasons for not reporting
incidents and near misses relate to blame
and fear, both that information may be
used against the reporter and of negative
reactions from co-workers.
Blame culture
A company policy of constantly developing
new procedures and checklists may also be
perceived as belonging to a blame culture.
Procedures and checklists that are
developed to control crew behaviour may
be seen as a person-oriented safety
approach, implying crew shortcomings as
the cause of error.
The problem is that the real underlying
cause is often to be found elsewhere in the
organisation, in the form of manning policy
or commercial pressure.
There are several drawbacks with a
person-orientated safety approach. First,
when human error is cited as the cause of
a failure, crews may perceive this as
implying blame and, as suggested, this
perception can have an adverse affect on
reporting practices afloat.
A second drawback concerns
developments in safety measures. With
human error cited as the cause of failure,
the tendency is for safety measures to seek
to control human behaviour with
procedures and checklists.
Then, when the real cause is found to
lie elsewhere in the organisation, such
measures may clearly not be the answer to
the underlying problem and incidents of
failure and accidents will continue to
occur. This may develop into a cycle of
blame, where – the next time human error
is cited as the cause of failure – the
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situation appears worse because the crew
have already been warned.
At the same time, the crew’s perception
may well be that the relevant measures are
not helping them in their daily tasks. This
state of affairs may have arisen, either
because the crew were not being
consulted, their experience was not taken
seriously, or insufficient allowance was
made for the specific circumstances that
apply in the vessel in question.
Procedures, so discredited, tend to be
breached deliberately and this is unlikely
to encourage conscientious reporting or to
contribute to good safety management.
Another hindrance is the reporting system
itself, which is often perceived to be too
complicated and time consuming.
A common view at sea is that the SMS
is a paper-production system which
requires constantly increasing
administrative work, without having a
proportionate effect on safety. Field
studies have revealed situations where
administrative tasks have been carried out
at the expense of time spent focusing on
practical work and operational challenges.
Vicious cycle
All this may be seen as a vicious cycle that
undermines and degrades safety. To break
out of it will require the following features
of human nature and error to be
recognised:
 First, human actions are almost always
constrained by factors beyond an
individual’s immediate control;
 Second, most human failure does not
result from intentional actions. People
cannot easily avoid actions which they did
not intend to perform in the first place;
 Third, among a number of causes of
error are those that are personal, task-
related, situational and organisational;
 Finally, within a skilled, experienced
and largely well intentioned workforce,
while it may well be feasible to improve
situations, people are less amenable.
I also believe that employment
conditions and crew stability are
influential factors. Trust, good safety
management and proper safety practices
all evolve over time, as a result of close
interaction and feedback. 
Organisations have to communicate
safety as a priority with a united voice
throughout their establishment, supported
by evidential actions.
Crews need to be provided with the
required resources and support if work is
delayed for safety reasons. Each vessel,
even within the same fleet, is different
where structural conditions, crew
experience and competence are concerned.
In such circumstances, it may not be
easy to standardise measures. Safety
could be managed more efficiently, if crew
were allowed to make local adjustments.
Finally, in a SMS, all of the parts are
equally important and mutually dependent.
Amendments should apply to the system as
a whole, and not be limited to individual
components.
 This article is based on a paper given
‘The use of safety management systems
within the Norwegian tanker industry – do
they really improve safety?’ Reliability,
Risk and Safety Applications conference in
Prague, September 2009. A pdf of the full
paper may be obtained from the author at
helle.oltedal@hsh.no
The statistical data used are derived
from a survey carried out in 2006. A total
of 987 questionnaires were distributed to
44 randomly selected vessels, of which 41
vessels returned a total of 768 completed,
which is a fairly good vessel response rate
of 93 per cent and an individual response
rate of 78 per cent. The interpretation of
questionnaire results is supported by
qualitative information deriving from two
case studies.
